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APPLICABIHTY OF NEPA'S IMPACT
STATEMENT REQUIREMENT TO THE EPA
INTRODUCTION
Two recent decisions by the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit have established a narrow exemption from the
requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)1 for
certain regulatory activities of the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA).2 In Portland Cement Association v. Ruckelshaus3 the court
held that the EPA is not required to file an environmental impact
statement under NEPA prior to promulgating stationary source air
pollution standards for new or modified portland cement plants pur-
suant to section 111 of the Clean Air Act.4 In March 1971 the Ad-
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq. (1970). Section 102(2) (C) of NEPA prescribes that
an impact statement shall consist of a "detailed statement" on
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should
the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environ-
ment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which
would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented. 42
U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), the entity having primary responsibil-
ity for advising the executive on matters concerning environmental protection, see notes
31-33 infra and accompanying text, has issued advisory guidelines for the various agen-
cies to follow in the preparation of impact statements. CEQ GumLnUNs, 38 Fed. Reg.
20,550 (1973). For a thorough discussion of the general subject of the preparation
and content of impact statements, see F. ANDnRsoN, NEPA i THE CourTs 179-245
(1973).
HEREAFTER THE FOLLOWING CITATION WILL BE USED IN THIS
NOTE:
F. ANDERsON, NEPA IN =a CoURTs (1973) [hereinafter cited as ANDERSON].
2. The EPA was created by Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970. 35 Fed. Reg.
15,623 (1970). See note 24 infra. The purpose of the new agency was explained by
the President as that of making a coordinated attack on the whole range of environ-
mental problems. Message of the President, July 9, 1970, reprinted at 42 U.S.C. §
4321 note, at 10,661. Describing the EPA as a "strong, independent agency," the Pres-
ident expressed the intention that the EPA focus on setting and enforcing pollution
control standards, rather than serving in a completely advisory capacity in matters of
environmental policy as does the CEQ. Id. at 10,661, 10,663. See notes 24, 32 infra
and accompanying text.
3. 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), petition for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3388
(U.S. Jan. 8, 1974) (No. 73-1008).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-6 (1970). This provision of the Clean Air Act directs the
Administrator of the EPA to designate categories of stationary sources which "may
contribute significantly to air pollution which causes or contributes to the endangerment
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ministrator of the EPA5 designated portland cement plants as a sta-
tionary source of air pollution" and in December 1971 issued standards
of performance for the emission of pollutants from these sources.7
The Portland Cement Association challenged the validity of these
standards on the grounds that, inter alia, the Administrator had failed
to file an environmental impact statement as required by NEPA.
Concluding that section 111 of the Clean Air Act requires the EPA
to compile the "functional equivalent" of a NEPA impact statement
when setting emission standards, the Portland court held that the EPA
is not required to comply with NEPA in establishing standards pursu-
ant to that section." In a subsequent case, Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc. v. EPA,9 the District of Columbia Circuit further held that
the EPA is not required to file an environmental impact statement
to justify the cancellation of the registration of a pesticide pursuant
to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).xo
The case concerned challenges to the EPA's cancellation of all regis-
trations for the use of DDT, except for limited public health and agri-
cultural pest quarantine purposes.11 The court found that FIFRA,
like section 111 of the Clean Air Act, requires the "functional equiva-
lent" of a NEPA statement prior to cancellation of a registration state-
ment, inasmuch as it provides sufficient substantive and procedural
standards to ensure adequate consideration of environmental issues.12
of public health or welfare," and to promulgate standards of performance for these cat-
egories. Id. § 6(b)(1)(a).
5. The Administrator of the EPA is designated as head of the agency by section
l(b) of the Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970. 35 Fed. Reg. 15,623 (1970). See
note 24 infra.
6. 36 Fed. Reg. 5931 (1971).
7. 40 C.F.R. § 60.60 (1973).
8. Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 384 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
See also Essex Chemical Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 427, 431 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 42 U.S.LW. 3610 (U.S. Apr. 29, 1974).
9. 489 F.2d 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
10. 7 U.S.C. §§ 135-135k (1970). The purpose of FIFRA is to require the
registration of every economic poison distributed or sold in the United States. The
Administrator's primary functions under FIFRA are to consider applications for
the registration of economic poisons and to determine if registered economic poisons
should be cancelled or suspended. Id. § 135b (1970). An order of the Administrator
cancelling a registration must set forth detailed findings of fact and must be based on
substantial evidence developed at a hearing, if a public hearing is held. Id. § 135b(c)
(1970). The Administrator of the EPA acquired the authority to administer the act
pursuant to Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970. See note 24 infra.
11. 489 F.2d at 1249. The Environmental Defense Fund contended that the EPA
should have banned all uses of DDT. On the other hand, Coahoma Chemical Com-
pany and other DDT producers and users challenged the cancellation order as going
too far. Id.
12. Id. at 1256-57.
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Consequently, the court held that, in actions taken pursuant to
FIFRA, the EPA was excused from strict compliance with the impact
statement requirements of NEPA.13
ORIGIN OF THE PROBLEM
NEPA's Ambiguous Legislative History
As its name implies, NEPA declares a national policy to "encour-
age productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environ-
ment .... "14 To assure the effective implementation of this policy,
section 102(2) (C) of NEPA requires all agencies of the federal gov-
ernment, to the fullest extent possible, to file an environmental impact
statement prior to embarking upon "major Federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment .... ." However,
despite the plain language of section 102(2) (C), the legislative his-
tory of the Act raises doubts as to whether Congress intended NEPA's
impact statement requirement to apply to those agencies that were al-
ready charged with environmental protection responsibility at the time
NEPA was enacted. While neither NEPA itself nor the Committee
reports expressly exempt regulatory agencies bearing some responsibil-
ity for environmental protection, 16 such an exemption is suggested by
language in a document entitled "Major Changes in S. 1075 as passed
by the Senate," which Senator Jackson placed into the Congressional
Record during the Senate debate on NEPA immediately prior to adop-
tion of the final Conference Report on the Act. This document stated
that section 102 of NEPA was "not designed to result in any change
in the manner in which [those agencies with prior authority for en-
vironmental protection] carry out [that] authority.'' lr Senator Muskie
also joined in the debate at this point to underscore the fact that it
13. Id. at 1257.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970). For a discussion of what constitutes a "ma-
jor" federal action "significantly affecting the quality of the human environment," see
ANDERSON 73-105.
It should be noted that, while the impact statement requirement has stimulated
the most litigation and public discussion, it is not the only "action-forcing" provision
of NEPA. See id. at 3.
16. Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 381 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
see S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. REP. No. 765, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1969).
17. 115 CONG. REc. 40,417, 40,418 (1969). The document further stated that
[tihis provision is, however, clearly designed to assure consideration of en-
vironmental matters by all agencies in their planning and decision making-
especially those agencies who now have little or no legislative authority to
take environmental considerations into account. Id.
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was his "clear understanding" that the legislative mandates of those
agencies were not changed in any way.'" In the House of Representa-
fives, Congressman Dingell, the House sponsor of the Act, inserted
a similar statement of interpretation into the record."" However,
neither the final Conference Report on the Act nor the section-by-
section analysis of NEPA embodied in that report includes an exemp-
tion for such agencies.2 0 Thus, while the views of Senators Jackson
and Muskie, the senatorial sponsors of NEPA, are entitled to some
weight,2 ' there is general agreement that the legislative history of
NEPA is inconclusive as to the applicability of the impact statement
requirement of NEPA to environmental agencies. 22
Application of NEPA to the New Agency
Even if congressional intent were clear as to the applicability of
NEPA to the agencies already vested with environmental protection
responsibility when the Act was passed, the applicability of NEPA's
environmental impact statement requirement to the EPA is even fur-
ther obfuscated by the fact that the EPA was not then even in exis-
tence. NEPA was enacted by Congress in late 1969, whereas the
creation of the EPA did not come about until almost one year later
in December 1970.23 Moreover, the EPA was not created by an act
18. Id. at 40,423.
19. Id. at 40,925. Congressman Dingell's remarks were in the form of answers to
questions submitted to him by Congressman Fallon, Chairman of the House Committee
on Public Works. The specific question asked was what would be the effect of the
legislation on the Federal Water Pollution Control Agency (a predecessor of the EPA).
The answer, in part, was as follows:
Many existing agencies ... already have important responsibilities in the
area of environment control. The provisions of Sections 102 and 103 are not
designed to result in any change in the manner in which they carry out their
environmental protection authority. Id.
20. H.R. REP. No. 765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1969), reprinted in U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2767, 2769-70 (1969). See also 115 CONG. REc. 40,422 (1969)
(remarks of Senator Alott).
21. Senator Jackson was sponsor of S. 1075, the original Senate version of NEPA,
and chaired the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, which considered
the bill. ANDERSON 5. He also acted as floor manager for the Conference Report.
Senator Muskie was Chairman of the Subcommittee on Air Pollution of the Committee
on Public Works. Id. See also Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375,
381 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
22. See, e.g., Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 383 (D.C.
Cir. 1973); Comment, Halfway There: EPA's "Environmental Explanations" and
the Duty to File Impact Statements, 3 ENViRONMENTAL L. REP. 10,139, 10,140 n.2
(1972); 1973 DuKE L.J. 347, 350, in 1972 Developments.
23. The conference report was agreed to by the Senate on December 20, 1969,
115 CONG. R.c. 40,415-27 (1969), and the House on December 23, 1969, id. at 40,923-
28. NEPA became effective on January 1, 1970. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970).
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of Congress, but by the President's exercising his powers of agency
reorganization in order to transfer the federal government's then
widely dispersed environmental protection functions to one centralized
agency.24 It is obviously more than moderately difficult to infer from
such an executive action any congressional intent regarding the appli-
cability of NEPA to the new agency. Thus, even had Congress in-
tended NEPA's impact statement requirement to apply to those
agencies which bore some type of environmental protection respon-
sibility when the Act was passed, it by no means necessarily follows
that Congress would have also intended that NEPA apply to the new
centralized agency whose sole task is the preservation and protection
of the environment.25
The EPA came into being on December 2, 1970. See Message of the President, July
9, 1970, reprinted at 42 U.S.C. § 4321 note, at 10,659.
24. The EPA was created by Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg.
15,623 (1970), which was prepared by the President and transmitted to the Congress
on July 9, 1970, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §§ 901 et seq. (1970). This statute permits
such a reorganization "to promote the better execution of the laws, the more effective
management of the executive branch and of its agencies and functions, and the expedi-
tious administration of the public business," id. § 901(a)(1), and "to increase the effi-
ciency of the operations of the Government to the fullest extent practicable," id. § 901
(a)(3). See also Message of the President, July 9, 1970, reprinted at 42 U.S.C. §
4321 note, at 10,661.
The functions transferred to the Administrator of the EPA under Reorganization
Plan No. 3 include:
-The functions carried out by the Federal Water Quality Administration (from
the Department of the Interior).
-Functions with respect to pesticides studies now vested in the Department of
the Interior.
-The functions carried out by the National Air Pollution Control Administration
(from the Department of Health, Education and Welfare).
-The functions carried out by the Bureau of Solid Waste Management and the
Bureau of Water Hygiene, and portions of the functions carried out by the Bu-
reau of Radiological Health of the Environmental Control Administration (from
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare).
-Certain functions with respect to pesticides carried out by the Food and Drug
Administration (from the Department of Health, Education and Welfare).
-Authority to perform studies relating to ecological systems now vested in the
Council on Environmental Quality.
-Certain functions respecting radiation criteria and standards now vested in the
Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Radiation Council.
-Functions respecting pesticides registration and related activities now carried out
by the Agricultural Research Service (from the Department of Agriculture).
Message of the President, July 9, 1970, reprinted at 42 U.S.C. § 4321 note, at
10,661-62.
See 1973 DuKE L.J. 347, 351 n.26, in 1972 Developments.
25. Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 380 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
For treatment of the question of NEPA's applicability to the EPA by other com-
mentators, see Comment, Implementation of the Clean Air Act: Should NEPA
Apply to the Environmental Protection Agency?, 3 EcoLOGY L.Q. 597 (1973); Note,
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Subsequent Legislative and Administrative Developments
Legislative developments since the passage of NEPA have not
A Fight Between Friends: EPA v. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,
69 GEo. L.J. 913 (1974).
There was an attempt in 1973 by some members of Congress to resolve the doubts
as to whether NEPA applies to the EPA by inserting clarifying language into another
piece of legislation, the Agriculture-Environmental and Consumer Protection Appro-
priation Act for 1974, Pub. L. 93-135, 87 Stat. 468 (Oct. 24, 1973). This act appro-
priated $5,000,000
to provide for the preparation of Environmental Impact Statements as
required by section 102(2)(C) of the National Environmental Policy Act on
all proposed actions by the Environmental Protection Agency, except where
prohibited by law. . . . Id. at 482 (emphasis added).
Although the language of this provision appears to be unequivocal in its requirement
of an impact statement for most actions proposed by the EPA, its legislative history
casts some doubt on its actual significance. When the conference version of the bill
was considered in the House of Representatives, Congressman Dingell, who had intro-
duced the original House version of NEPA, took the position that this provision was
merely a restatement of law as it existed at that time. He made it clear that under
his view of the then-present law the EPA was permitted an exemption from the man-
date of NEPA only in two narrow situations-where there existed a specific statutory
exemption of the agency from NEPA and where the best interests of NEPA would
be served by dispensing with the formal requirements of section 102(2)(C) of NEPA.
See 119 CONG. REc. H8307 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1973) (remarks of Mr. Dingell). Rep-
resentative Dingell relied in part upon an opinion of the General Accounting Office,
the Comptroller General's opinion of June 6, 1973 (B-170,186), which had been pre-
pared in response to a request by the Congressman for an opinion on the basic issue.
Concluding that "the plain words of the applicable statute require the conclusion that
the EPA is subject" to the impact statement requirement, this opinion took the position
that the EPA, as a federal agency, must comply with NEPA along with all other fed-
eral agencies. Id. At the same time, however, the GAO report had warned that "this
complicated issue is currently the subject of litigation and the final determination of
EPA's responsibilities under NEPA is in the hands of the judiciary." Id. See also
4 BNA ENVIRONMENT REP. 892 (1973).
In the Senate, the conferees likewise expressed the view that the appropriation
provision was not intended to change existing law. 119 CONG. REC. S18,977-78 (daily
ed. Oct. 10, 1973) (remarks of Senators McGee and Fong). This conclusion was pred-
icated on the observation that neither house permits legislation in an appropriation bill.
See id. at S18,977 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1973) (remarks of Senator Fong). See also SEN-
ATE COMM. ON RULES AND ADMINISTRATION, STANDING RULES OF THE UNITED STATES
SENATE AND PROVISIONS OF THE LEGISLATIVE REORGANIZATION ACTS OF 1946 AND 1970
RELATING TO OPERATION OF THE SENATE, Rule XVI(2) (1972). Accordingly, the Sen-
ate view of the provision in the appropriation act which requires the EPA to file im-
pact statements on all proposed actions except where prohibited by law neither "add[s]
to, nor subtract[s] from, existing law governing the Environmental Protection Agency."
119 CONG. REC. S18,977 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1973) (remarks of Senator Fong). How-
ever, the two houses appear to have been completely at odds as to the more important
question of what the existing law is. The view expressed in the Senate was that NEPA
does not apply to the regulatory activities of environmental agencies such as the EPA.
Id. at S18,977-78 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1973) (remarks of Senator Fong). Therefore,
if the original purpose of the provision making this $5,000,000 appropriation to the
EPA was to clarify the issue as to whether the EPA is required to comply with NEPA,
it apparently has failed.
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resolved the question of NEPA's applicability to the EPA. Section
511 (c) of the 1972 amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act (FWPCA)2 6 state that section 102(2)(C) of NEPA is not
applicable to EPA activities under that Act except where grants are
made for the construction of publicly owned waste treatment works
and where the agency issues permits for projects constituting new
sources of water pollution. The EPA, which has maintained that its
regulatory activities are completely exempt from NEPA, has argued
that this provision is an affirmation of an allegedly preexisting con-
gressional intent regarding the inapplicability of NEPA to the EPA."
On the other hand, opponents of this view have taken the position
that the very existence of section 511(c) in the 1972 amendments
illustrates that Congress recognized the need to create a specific statu-
tory exemption, because Congress, in originally enacting NEPA, in no
way intended to exempt the predecessors of the EPA from NEPA's
environmental impact statement requirements and thus not the EPA
itself.2 ' These contrary interpretations of the section 511(c) exemp-
tion were also reflected in the congressional debate which preceded
section 511(c)'s adoption.29  But, even assuming that the debate pre-
dominantly favored either view of the issue, the opinion of the later
Congress which enacted section 511(c) would be at best a "hazardous
basis" for inferring the intent of an earlier Congress in enacting
NEPA.30
Title II of NEPA created the Council of Environmental Quality
(CEQ) in the Executive Office of the President.31  The CEQ's func-
tion is primarily advisory and includes the duty to advise the President
on matters of environmental policy, to assist in the preparation of the
annual Environmental Quality Report, and to review and appraise the
environmental aspects of the various programs of the federal govern-
ment.82 By executive order the CEQ is authorized to issue advisory
26. 33 U.S.C. § 1371(c) (Supp. 11 1972).
27. See, e.g., Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaut, 352 F. Supp. 697, 713 (D. Colo.
1972), rev'd on other grounds, 482 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1973).
28. See Brief for Long Island Lighting Co. as Amicus Curiae at 3, Essex Chem.
Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The Brief makes the further
argument that the fact that Congress found it necessary to create an express exemption
from NEPA indicates that "Congress never intended to allow backdoor exemptions to
NEPA by implication." Id.
29. 118 CONG. REc. S16,877-90 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1972); id. at H9118-27. See
also ANDERSON 115-16.
30. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 170 (1968); Water-
man S.S. Corp. v. United States, 381 U.S. 252, 269 (1965); Portland Cement Ass'n
v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 382 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 4342 (1970).
32. Id. § 4344.
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guidelines to federal agencies governing the preparation of environ-
mental impact statements."3 Based on its own interpretation of
NEPA's legislative history,34 the CEQ initially took the position in its
first set of guidelines that the EPA's regulatory activities are exempt
from section 102(2)(C) of NEPA. 5 However, in its 1973 revision
of -these guidelines, the CEQ, without expressly reversing its position,
retracted the broad claim that the EPA was in no way subject to the
requirements of NEPA. 6 The EPA strongly resisted the removal of
its specific exemption from the CEQ Guidelines and has steadfastly
maintained its position that Congress did not intend its regulatory ac-
tivities to be subject to the mandate of NEPA.3 At the same time,
the EPA has taken some action to comply with NEPA, without conced-
ing that it is actually subject to NEPA's prescriptions. In 1973 the
EPA announced that it would publish "full explanations" when it pro-
poses "major standards, regulations, and guidelines . . .which either
prescribe national standards of environmental quality, or require na-
tional emission, effluent, or performance standards or limitations.""8
33. Exec. Order No. 11,514, 3 C.F.R. 285 (1973).
34. The CEQ did not specify the portions of NEPA's legislative history upon
which it based its interpretation. See 1973 DunKn L.J 347, 349, in 1972 Developments.
35. CEQ GumELINs § 5(d), 36 Fed. Reg. 7724, 7725 (1971).
36. CEQ GumnmLNEs, 38 Fed. Reg. 20,550 (1973). See Section-by-section Com-
ment and Explanation of Major Proposed Revisions, 38 Fed. Reg. 10,865 (1973),
where the CEQ relied upon section 511(c) of the 1972 amendments to the FWPCA
as its reason for making the deletion. See text accompanying notes 26-30 supra. But
the CEQ did not attempt to explain why this specific statutory exemption necessitated
a full retraction. In any event, the CEQ has in effect shifted the entire responsibility
for justifying any exemption for the EPA from NEPA to the EPA itself by stating
that the issue will be addressed in the EPA's revised "NEPA procedures." 38 Fed.
Reg. 10,865 (1973). Every federal agency, including the EPA, is required to prepare,
publish, and periodically revise such "procedures" to identify those agency actions
which require impact statements and to outline the agency's internal procedures for
their preparation. CEQ GumnE'uis § 3(a), 38 Fed. Reg. 20,550 (1973).
37. See 4 BNA ENVmormNr REP. 440 (1973). In any event, the CEQ's inter-
pretation of NEPA has no legal significance. Cf. Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckels-
haus, 486 F.2d 375, 382-83 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (an advisory agency is in no better
position than a court of appeals to interpret legislative history); Hiram Clarke Civic
Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 424 (5th Cir. 1973) (CEQ does not have authority
to prescribe regulations governing compliance with NEPA). But cf. 1972 Dunn L.J
667, 677 (argument that the CEQ Guidelines have the force of law). Thus, the CEQ's
action in revising the Guidelines may amount to nothing more than a decision to leave
the determination of the legal obligations of the EPA under NEPA up to the judiciary.
38. Major Standards, Regulations, and Guidelines, 38 Fed. Reg. 15,653 (1973).
The procedure went into effect on December 31, 1973. This form of intermediate
compliance was suggested by an EPA task force report which studies the anticipated
burden of full compliance with NEPA by the EPA. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEC-
TION AGENCY, APPLICATION OF THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT TO EPA's
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORY Acnvrrms 81-82 (1973).
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The EPA set forth two considerations underlying the decision to estab-
lish these procedures: (1) a belief that "the public should be fully
apprised of the environmental effects of the Agency's major standard-
setting actions;" 9 and (2) a belief that "the public should be provided
with detailed background information to assist it in commenting on
the merits of a proposed action."140  While it is true that by informing
the public, these "explanations" fulfill one of the purposes of an im-
pact statement,41 they have nonetheless been criticized as "disappoint-
ing half measure[s]' '42 because these environmental "explanations" fall
short of the protections offered by full impact statements in several
important respects: (1) there is no requirement that the "explana-
tions" be made available to the President and the CEQ, nor that they
be circulated among other agencies;4 3 (2) there is no provision for
the "explanations" to accompany the proposal through the existing
agency review processes; 44 (3) there is no opportunity for review of
the adequacy of the "explanations" in the courts; 45 and (4) there is
no assurance that the five factors which must be considered in the
preparation of the detailed impact statement be taken into account in
preparation of the "explanations."46
39. 38 Fed. Reg. 15,653 (1973).
40. Id.
41. See 42U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
42. See Comment, supra note 22, at 10,139.
43. Compare with 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
44. Compare with id.
45. While neither NEPA nor its legislative history mentions judicial review,
the courts "have been vigorous in reviewing agency compliance with NEPA." ANDER-
soN 16. For a thorough discussion of judicial review under NEPA, see Note, Judicial
Review, Delegation and Public Hearings Under NEPA, 1974 DUKE L.I 423, in 1973
Developments.
46. Compare with 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970), the five requirements of which are
set forth in note 1 supra.
The EPA directive does prescribe the content of an "explanation" as follows:
(a) Information available to the Agency delineating the major environ-
mental effects of the proposed action;(b) A discussion of pertinent non-environmental factors affecting the
decision including, where relevant under the applicable statute, legal, techni-
cal, social, and economic factors; and
(c) An explanation of viable options available to the Agency, and the
rationale for the option selected, in sufficient detail to apprise a reader, not
an expert in the subject matter involved, of the issues. 38 Fed. Reg. 15,653
(1973).
While these elements reflect some of the considerations which must be taken into ac-
count in the preparation of an impact statement, they are clearly not as comprehensive
as those specified for full impact statements. Furthermore, these elements of the EPA
"explanations" simply do not rise to the level of an enforceable mandate as in the case
of the action-forcing provisions of NEPA. A further criticism of the adoption of these
new EPA "regulations" was made by Congressman Dingell during the congressional
debate over the Agriculture-Environmental and Consumer Protection Act of 1974.
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DIVERGENT JUDICIAL APPROACHES
Strict Procedural Compliance
The first case actually to consider the applicability of NEPA to
the EPA was Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus,47 which involved regula-
He suggested that the Act was in part an attempt "to circumvent NEPA's requirements
and. . . to gain congressional endorsement for this approach" through passage of the
Senate version of that Act which would have appropriated funds for such environmental
"explanations." 119 CONG. REc. H8306 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1973) (remarks of Mr.
Dingell); see note 25 supra. Congressman Dingell also raised the objection that the
new EPA "regulations" were adopted "without benefit of public comment thereon as
required by the rulemaking provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C.
§ 553)." 119 CONG. REc. H8306 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1973) (remarks of Mr. Dingell).
47. 352 F. Supp. 697 (D. Colo. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 482 F.2d 1301
(10th Cir. 1973). In a previous case, Getty Oil Co. v. Ruckelshaus, the Third Circuit
had touched on the issue, but only by way of dictum. 467 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973). Getty Oil involved the application by a Delaware
oil refinery operator for preliminary and permanent injunctions and a temporary re-
straining order staying the effect of a compliance order issued by the Administrator
pursuant to section 113 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8 (1970), requiring
the company to comply with a Delaware state air pollution regulation that had been
approved by the EPA. Getty Oil argued that by failing to file an impact statement,
the EPA's compliance order was ultra vires. In affirming the district court's denial
of Getty Oil's application, the Third Circuit held that section 307 of the Clean Air
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5 (1970), required the plaintiff to raise any NEPA objection
at the time the state implementation plan was under consideration, not in an enforce-
ment proceeding, 467 F.2d at 359. See Comment, supra note 22, at 10,140; 1973 DuKn
L.J. 347, 354 n.4, in 1972 Developments. Because of this procedural deficiency in
the plaintiffs presentation of his claim, the court did not even reach the merits of
Getty Oil's contention that the EPA's failure to file an impact statement rendered the
action of the EPA in issuing the compliance order ultra vires. But the court did note
that it found the authority for Getty's contention unpersuasive. 467 F.2d at 359 n.17.
The authority relied upon by Getty Oil was Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. 1
(D.D.C. 1971) and Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 1401 (D.D.C.
1971). Kalur held that the Army Corps of Engineers was required to prepare an im-
pact statement before issuing a permit to dump refuse into a navigable waterway in
accordance with the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1970). The
1972 Amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act transferred this refuse
permit responsibility to the EPA and exempted the EPA from the NEPA impact state-
ment requirement for that function. See note 26 supra and accompanying text. As
a result of this legislation, Kalur was dismissed as moot several months after the Getty
Oil case and therefore no longer retains precedential value. See Portland Cement Ass'n
v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 385 n.41 (D.C. Cir. 1973). It is likely that the
FWPCA was amended because of the holding in Kalur. See Anaconda Co. v. Ruckels-
haus, 352 F. Supp. 697, 711 n.7 (D. Colo. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 482 F.2d
1301 (10th Cir. 1973).
In Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, the District Court for the District
of Columbia denied a motion to enjoin the Secretary of Agriculture from undertaking a
program to control the fire ant by chemical means. In so doing the court noted that
the use of substances registered under FIFRA does not exempt the program from
the requirements of NEPA nor does withdrawal of the registration under FIFRA
deprive the court of jurisdiction under NEPA. 325 F. Supp. at 1407.
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tory action taken by the EPA pursuant to section 110 of the Clean Air
Act.48  That section establishes procedures for the adoption by the
EPA of plans designed by each state to provide for the implementa-
tion, maintenance, and enforcement of primary and secondary na-
tional ambient air quality standards4 and authorizes the EPA Adminis-
trator himself to prepare and implement such a plan if the state plan
is inadequate or if the state refuses to submit a plan.8 0 In Anaconda,
the operator of a copper smelter in Montana challenged the promulga-
tion by the EPA Administrator of a proposed plan to control emission
of sulphur oxides, a common by-product of copper smelting, following
the failure of the state to provide a control strategy for these pollu-
tants in the plan it had submitted in an effort to comply with the re-
quirements of section 110.r1 The plaintiff company sought to enjoin
implementation of the EPA plan on the ground that the EPA had
failed to prepare an environmental impact statement prior to adopting
the plan.82 The EPA contended first that it was not subject to this
This case probably was not regarded as persuasive authority for the proposition
that the EPA is required to comply with NEPA for several reasons: (1) even though
the Department of Agriculture is a quasi-environmental agency which administered
FIFRA prior to the creation of the EPA, it does not necessarily follow that the EPA
is subject to the same determinations that were made with respect to its predecessor.
See note 25 supra and accompanying text. The primary function of the Department
of Agriculture is not consideration of environmental factors, but promotion of agricul-
ture; and (2) the case did not actually consider whether the FIFRA procedures for
the registration or cancellation of a chemical insecticide in themselves satisfy NEPA.
Rather, the case merely held that the entire fire ant control program, of which the
FIFRA proceeding was only a part, was a major federal action requiring a NEPA state-
ment. Id.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (1970).
49. Id. The national ambient air quality standards are established by the Admin-
istrator for each pollutant in accordance with section 109 of the Clean Air Act. Id.
A primary standard is defined in that section as an ambient air quality standard "the
attainment and maintenance of which . . . [is] requisite to protect the public health."
Id. -4(b)(1). A secondary standard is one necessary to protect "the public welfare
from any known or anticipated adverse effects associated with the presence of such
air pollutant in the ambient air." Id. -4(b) (2). Under the Act each state is required
to submit an implementation plan to the Administrator of the EPA for his approval.
Id. -5.
50. Id. -5(c). Under the terms of section 110, id. -5(a) (2), the Administrator may
only approve a state plan if it satisfies the requirements of that section and is based
on the national ambient air quality criteria established under the Act. See 1973 DUKE
L.J. 347 nn.4, 6, in 1972 Developments.
51. 352 F. Supp. at 700.
52. Thus, Anaconda involved the unusual situation in which the protections of the
procedural requirements of NEPA were being invoked not by the traditional environ-
mentally-minded plaintiff, but by a component of industry. Cf. ANDERSON 121-22.
Actually, it should come as no real surprise that the industrial sector has sought refuge
within the procedural requirements of NEPA. As Anaconda illustrates, if the EPA
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requirement of NEPA, because NEPA does not apply to environmen-
tal agencies. 53  The EPA's principal argument in favor of this proposi-
tion was that the exemption from NEPA created for the EPA by the
1972 -amendments to the FWPCA54 was applicable not only to the
FWPCA, but also to other federal environmental legislation, including
the Clean Air Act.55 Denominating this argument a "masterful non
sequitur," the Anaconda court rejected it by observing that the plain
wording of the FWPCA amendment exempts the EPA from NEPA
only as to action taken under the FWPCA.5 6  The EPA further con-
tended that, presumably even if NEPA were held to apply generally
to the EPA, the Clean Air Act permits consideration of nothing other
than air purity in the establishment of air quality standards." Uhder
this argument, the limited scope of discretion ,allowed the EPA when
it undertakes to set standards under the Clean Air Act precludes con-
sideration of alternatives or a weighing of costs and benefits which
is required by NEPA. The District Court for the District of Colorado
rejected this argument as well, refusing to accept the notion that Con-
gress desired the EPA to ignore the cost of implementation measures
sets a standard for control of one pollutant without being forced to consider the effect
that full compliance by industry will have on other forms of pollution, then industry
may encounter excessive costs, or even find itself unable to comply at all, when faced
with a combination of regulations:
[ilt is starkly clear that when an environmental agency says that its duty
is to protect one part of the environment even though that protection causesgreat harm to another part of the environment, Congress was possessed of
great wisdom when it said that all governmental agencies must file NEPA
statements where there is major federal action. We thought that environmen-
tal agencies would be the ones which would be the most concerned with the
broad picture of environmental impact and harm, but our naivete is demon-
strated by the record in this case. Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 352 F.
Supp. 697, 710 (D. Colo. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 482 F.2d 1301(10th Cir. 1973) (emphasis in original).
53. 352 F. Supp. at 710. In partial support of this contention, the EPA relied upon
dicta in Getty Oil Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1125 (1973). See note 47 supra. The Anaconda court rejected this argument
on two grounds. First, as noted above, the Getty Oil court had not specifically ad-
dressed this question. Furthermore, the proposed stationary standards contested in An-
aconda may have forced Anaconda to spend millions of dollars over and above the
amounts necessary to meet the EPA's national ambient air quality standards and may
have created other significant problems of air and water pollution and of solid waste
disposal. 352 F. Supp. at 701-02. Thus the Anaconda court found itself, more clearly
than the court in Getty Oil, confronted by a proposed rule which could do great harm
to other aspects of the environment, the economy, and the public welfare. 352 F.
Supp. at 710.
54. See notes 26-30 supra and accompanying text.
55. Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 352 F. Supp. 697, 713 (D. Colo. 1972), rev'd
on other grounds, 482 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1973).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 704-05, 710.
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taken pursuant to the Clean Air Act.58 Rather, the court examined
the language of NEPA itself and the cases which have construed it
and concluded that, taken together, these factors clearly imply that
NEPA applies to all federal agencies.59 The court then explicitly re-
duced the question to a simple syllogisn:
Major premise: All federal agencies must file a NEPA statement.
Minor premise: EPA is a federal agency.
Conclusion: EPA must file a NEPA statement. 60
Although this reasoning is logically appealing, another court later re-
jected the argument as "more simplistic than simple,"61 stating that
the weakness of the "myopic" approach taken by the Anaconda district
court was its reliance "on the non-obvious premise that EPA is a 'fed-
eral agency' within the meaning of NEPA."6 2  As has been noted
above, the EPA was clearly not a "federal agency" at the time of the
enactment of NEPA because it was not then in existence. 63 Whatever
apparent validity the questionable reasoning of the district court in
Anaconda may have, its precedential impact was substantially impaired
by the reversal of the case on other grounds on appeal.6 4
58. Id. at 705.
59. 352 F. Supp. at 710-14. The court relied upon numerous cases primarily from
the Tenth Circuit which support its conclusion that section 102(2)(C) of NEPA did
not carve out an exception for any federal agency. E.g., Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d
593 (10th Cir. 1972); National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir.
1971); Upper Pecos Ass'n v. Stans, 452 F.2d 1233 (10th Cir. 1971), vacated, 409 U.S.
1021 (1974); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C.
Cir. 1971); Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1971).
60. 352 F. Supp. at 713.
61. Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 379 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
62. Id. at 385 n.41.
63. See notes 23, 24 supra and accompanying text.
64. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's granting of the injunctive relief
on two related jurisdictional grounds. First, the court held that appeal to a district
court by an aggrieved party for a stay of an implementation plan proposed by the EPA
was inappropriate, since section 307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-
5(6)(1) (1970), specifically designates the Court of Appeals as the exclusive forum
for review of such a plan. Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 482 F.2d 1301, 1304-05
(10th Cir. 1973). The court found another reason for denying relief in the fact that,
although there was only one party to whom the regulations could possibly be applied,
352 F. Supp. at 700, they were merely "proposed" in form rather than formalized and
final. 482 F.2d at 1305. Consequently, the Tenth Circuit did not reach the merits
of the contention of the Anaconda Company that the EPA must comply with NEPA.
7d.
It should be noted, however, that there is strong dictum indicating that the Tenth
Circuit in Anaconda disagreed with the district court's holding that the EPA was re-
quired to file an impact statement under NEPA: "Ihe EPA's sole mission is to
improve the quality of the human environment. To compel the filing of impact
statements could only serve to frustrate the accomplishment of the Act's objectives."
Vol. 1974:3531
DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1974:353
Complete Exemption from Compliance
A number of 1973 cases considered the argument that the EPA
is required to comply with section 102(2) (C) of NEPA. The Fourth
Circuit case of Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA 5 involved a challenge
similar to that in Anaconda of the adoption by the EPA of three state
plans for implementation of federal ambient air quality standards un-
der the Clean Air Act.6 6 In a brief paragraph the court flatly held
that NEPA is "inapplicable to the action of the Administrator in seek-
ing, through the approval of state implementation plans, to improve
'the quality of the human environment.'- 0 7  The court attempted, al-
beit with rather dubious success, to justify its unequivocal holding by
observing that "the Clean Air Act itself contains sufficient provisions
for the achievement of those goals sought to be attained by NEPA."05
Id. at 1305-06. The court went on to say, relying on the Portland Cement case, see
notes 3-8 supra and accompanying text, that the legislative history "clearly" establishes
that such a holding was not contemplated by Congress, id. at 1306, although the court
in Portland Cement actually found the legislative history to be inconclusive on the
issue. 486 F.2d at 383.
The Tenth Circuit did qualify its dictum by stating that the EPA must consider
alternative factors in arriving at the decision to approve a state implementation plan:
This is not to say that the EPA is exempt from weighing and consider-
ing other environmental effects of its order. Being engaged in the environ-
mental improvement effort, it must weigh these and other factors such as ec-
onomics. It should, of course, inquire as to whether, for example, water pol-
lution will result from its instant air cleaning program. No doubt it will fully
weigh and consider these factors. We cannot assume that the administrative
hearing will be a mere formality, that it will turn out to be a rubber stamp
operation. If it is deficient, however, the reviewing court can soon remedy
the condition. 482 F.2d at 1306.
It is not clear from the wording of the Tenth Circuit's statement whether it regards
the EPA's responsibility under the Clean Air Act as one which requires full functional
compliance with the basic mandate of NEPA or whether the standard for consideration
of alternatives can be satisfied by something less. See notes 8, 12 supra and accom-
panying text.
65. 477 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1973).
66. The petitioners in Appalachian Power were operators of power plants in Vir-
ginia and West Virginia and a steel manufacturer in Maryland, who were seeking re-
mand to the EPA of its approval of the states' plans for meeting the national ambient
air quality standards with instructions that the Administrator provide an evidentiary
hearing and file an impact statement. Id. at 499-500. The court refused to consider
a motion for remand until the Administrator had certified a full administrative record
for consideration by the reviewing court. Id. at 507. In so doing, the court held that
if it found, upon receiving and reviewing the full record, that the hearings which had
been conducted by each state prior to submission of its plan to the Administrator were
adequate and that the Administrator had reviewed those state hearings, then the Ad-
ministrator would not be required to hold further hearings prior to approval of the
state plan. Id. at 504. Accordingly, the motions were denied without prejudice to
right to renew.
67. Id. at 508.
68. Id., quoting Getty Oil Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 349, 359 (3d Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973). The Third Circuit's statement in Getty Oil was
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In Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA,69 the Third Circuit, relying primarily
predicated on three sections of the Clean Air Act: "[T]he Administrator is given the
responsibility of making policy reviews under 42 U.S.C. § 1857j-7, annual comprehen-
sive economic cost studies under 42 U.S.C. § 1857j-1, and periodic reports to Congress
under section 1857j-2." 467 F.2d at 359. The last two of these provisions, the annual
comprehensive cost studies and the periodic reports to Congress, have, however, been
regarded by another court as not affording as great a degree of protection of environ-
mental values as NEPA because they are post decision reporting requirements and do
not "offer the same timely and substantive impact on decision making as would com-
ments on possible adverse environmental impact during a rule-making proceeding."
Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 384 n.40 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Section 309 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-7 (1970), the provision of
the Act governing policy reviews by the Administrator and the other provision of the
Clean Air Act relied upon by the Getty Oil court in its conclusion that the goals of
NEPA are sufficiently provided for in the Clean Air Act, states that:
(a) The Administrator shall review and comment in writing on the en-
vironmental impact of any matter relating to duties and responsibilities
granted pursuant to this chapter or other provisions of the authority of the
Administrator, contained in any (1) legislation proposed by any Federal de-
partment or agency, (2) newly authorized Federal projects for construction
and any major Federal agency action (other than a project for construction)
to which section 4332(a)(C) of this title applies, and (3) proposed regula-
tions published by any department or agency of the Federal Government.
Such written comment shall be made public at the conclusion of any such
review.
(b) In the event the Administrator determines that any such legislation,
action, or regulation is unsatisfactory from the standpoint of public health or
welfare or environmental quality, he shall publish his determination and the
matter shall be referred to the Council on Environmental Quality. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1857h-7 (1970).
The District of Columbia Circuit in Portland Cement took the position that this section
offers little guidance to the resolution of the basic issue of whether NEPA's require-
ment of an impact statement extends to actions by the EPA:
That section merely requires the Administrator to review and comment
in writing on the impact on the environment of projects of another federal
agency "[which contains (sic)] any matter relat[ed] to duties and responsi-
bilities granted [to the Administrator] pursuant to this chapter." The con-
tention that this section implies the Administrator must file a draft impact
statement can only be resolved in the framework of the legislative history
which we have already reviewed. Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486
F.2d 375, 383 n.35 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Thus the straightforwardness of the Appalachian Power court's application of NEPA
to the EPA seems to have exceeded to a considerable degree the soundness of its ra-
tionale.
69. 481 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1973). Duquesne, like Anaconda and Appalachian Power,
was a case arising under section 110 of the Clean Air Act. In January 1972, the com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania submitted an implementation plan for control of sulphur
oxides, which was approved in part and disapproved in part by the Administrator in
May 1972. 481 F.2d at 5. The Administrator then incorporated restrictions on power
plant emissions in adopting the state implementation plan. The petitioners, two power
companies, then challenged these restrictions and sought to have the matter remanded
to the EPA for reconsideration and to have the EPA prepare an impact statement prior
to reapproving the plan. In addition to its determination that the EPA is not required
to file an impact statement, the Third Circuit held that the matter should be remanded
to the EPA to conduct a limited legislative hearing or, in the alternative, to refrain
from enforcing the plan against the two petitioning companies until they had had an
opportunity to exhaust their state administrative and judicial remedies. Id. at 10.
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upon the Appalachian Power decision, held that it would be "redun-
dant" to require the EPA to file environmental impact statements be-
cause its only function is to protect the environment.7 0  In Buckeye
70. Id. at 9, citing International Harvester Co. v. EPA, 478 F.2d 615, 650 n.130
(D.C. Cir. 1973); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495, 508 (4th Cir. 1973);
Getty Oil Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 349, 359 (3d Cir. 1972); Getty Oil Co. v.
Ruckelshaus, 342 F. Supp. 1006, 1020-22 (D. Del. 1972). Neither Getty Oil, see note
47 supra, nor International Harvester actually reached the merits of the issue. Interna-
tional Harvester involved a challenge to the EPA's refusal to suspend for one year its
1975 automobile emission standards. The EPA's failure to comply with § 102(2)(C)
of NEPA was merely one of several grounds relied upon by International Harvester
and other vehicle manufacturers to attack the EPA decision. The Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia remanded the matter to the EPA for further proceedings,
on the grounds that the petitioners had established by a preponderance of the evidence
in the record that the technology was not available, within the meaning of the Clean
Air Act, to achieve the standard, and that the Administrator had failed to meet his
resulting burden of proving that the standards could be met. 478 F.2d at 648. The
court further observed that the disposition on remand would require a "public interest
determination," which would satisfy the objectives of NEPA. Id. at 650 n.130. The
court defined the purpose of NEPA to be "to assure presentation to Congress and the
public of the environmental impact of executive action," which purpose necessarily
would be served by making a public interest determination of the petitioners' request
for a one-year suspension. Id. The EPA had a very narrowly defined statutory role
in this case to grant or to deny the one-year suspension-all alternatives would be ex-
hausted in making the either-or decision. The court did not, therefore, consider the
merits of a broader exemption. However, the court did touch on this issue in a fre-
quently cited footnote:
Although we do not reach the question whether EPA is automatically and
completely exempt from NEPA, we see little need in requiring a NEPA state-
ment from an agency whose raison d'etre is the protection of the environment
and whose decision on suspension is necessarily infused with the environmen-
tal considerations so pertinent to Congress in designing the statutory frame-
work. To require a "statement," in addition to a decision setting forth the
same considerations, would be a legalism carried to the extreme. ld.
This bit of dictum has been seized upon by various courts for various purposes.
For example, in Duquesne light Co. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 1, 9 (3d Cir. 1973), discussed
in note 69 supra and accompanying text, the Third Circuit focused on the language
"we see little need in requiring a NEPA statement from an agency whose raison
d'tre is the protection of the environment" to support a rather broad view of the
EPA's exemption. On the other hand, in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA,
489 F.2d 1247, 1256 n.58 (D.C. Cir. 1973), discussed in notes 9-13 supra and accom-
panying text and in notes 89-96 infra and accompanying text, the District of Columbia
Circuit relied upon the phrase---"To require a 'statement,' in addition to a decision
setting forth the same considerations would be a legalism carried to the extreme"-to
support a very narrow exception predicated upon the EPA's issuance of a "functional
equivalent" to a NEPA statement. Environmental Defense Fund did not reach the
question of whether the EPA is entitled to a broader exemption for all regulatory ac-
tivities. Id. at 1247.
One commentator has analyzed the International Harvester footnote as follows:
The language of the footnote makes it clear that the court is ruling solely
on the question where there is no environmental issue which the Agency has
discretion to consider; Congress' decision has foreclosed any discretion within
the Agency as to standards and has left it solely with the task of determining
as a technical matter whether the standards can be met in 1975 or 1976. De-
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Power, Inc. v. EPA,7 1 the plaintiff power companies also challenged
the EPA's approval of state plans for implementation of ambient air
quality standards on the grounds that the agency had not filed an
environmental impact statement prior to its determination.72 The
Sixth Circuit held that the EPA is not required to comply with NEPA
in making such decisions, reasoning that to impose such a requirement
"would mean that an agency whose sole purpose is improvement of
the environment, would have to file an Environmental Impact State-
ment with itself. ' 73  The rationale for the decision was predicated on
the simple view that since the EPA's mission is to make decisions af-
fecting the environment, it is not necessary to impose upon it a proce-
dural requirement which is designed to ensure agency consideration
of the environmental impact of its decisions. Hence, these three 1973
cases-Appalachian Power, Duquesne, and Buckeye Power-repre-
senting the common view of the Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits, sug-
gest a broad or blanket exemption of the EPA from the requirements
of NEPA. 74  However, none of these decisions rigorously analyzed the
problem to consider whether the purpose of NEPA would be served
by exempting the EPA from its mandate nor do any of these opinions
spite the court's loose statement about statements from an agency "whose rai-
son d'etre is the protection of the environment," the final sentence-which
shows that the court believed the Administrator's ruling on the standards sus-
pension fulfilled the role of a NEPA statement-demonstrates that no general
conclusion as to NEPA's application to EPA or to Clean Air Act matters
as a whole can be drawn from the footnote. Comment, Litigation Under the
Clean Air Act, 3 ENVIRONmENTAL L. REP. 10,007, 10,017 (1973).
71. 481 F.2d 162 (6th Cir. 1973).
72. Id. at 164-65. The petitioners were Ohio and Kentucky public utility power
companies. The grounds for complaint relied upon by the petitioners were (1) the
Administrator did not permit interested parties to participate in the proceedings as re-
quired by section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 553
(1967); (2) the plans were approved without regard to any impossibility of compliance
by the petitioners; and (3) the Administrator failed to file an environmental impact
statement. Id. at 165. The court held (1) that it was a violation of the APA to
refuse to permit interested parties to participate in the proceedings, (2) that it was
not necessary to conduct full hearings on the impossibility claims of the individual peti-
tioners since such claims could be raised as a defense in future enforcement proceed-
ings, and (3) that the Administrator was not required to file a NEPA statement. Id.
73. Id. at 174.
Buckeye Power claimed to be in accord with the Third (Getty Oil Co.), Fourth
(Appalachian Power), and D.C. (International Harvester) Circuits in holding that the
EPA is exempt from NEPA. 481 F.2d at 174. As one commentator has observed
[tihis was, of course, a misstatement with regard to the D.C. Circuit, which
issued no "holding" on the issue [see note 53 supra], and was somewhat mis-
leading as to the breadth of the holding of the other two courts. Comment,
supra note 22, at 10,141.
74. International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
is not included in this line of cases, even though others rely upon it, because of the
various interpretations given to its holding. See note 70 supra.
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discuss the limits of such an exemption.
The Functional Equivalence Doctrine
In contrast, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit in Portland Cement Association v. Ruckelshaus7 i and Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA,70 attempted to approach the central issue
with the policies underlying NEPA firmly in mind. While these cases
did not find it necessary to go beyond the recognition of a narrow
exception in exempting from NEPA the particular regulatory activities
of the EPA which had been called into question,77 the court did search
for a solution which would "strike a workable balance between some
of the advantages and disadvantages of NEPA.' '78  Through a careful
analysis of the language of section 111 of the Clean Air Act, the Port-
land Cement court79 reached the conclusion that section 111 of the
Clean Air Act requires the functional equivalent of a NEPA statement.
Section 111 requires the EPA to set "standards of performance" for
new or modified sources of air pollution.80 A "standard of perform-
ance" is defined as a standard which "reflects the degree of emission
limitation achievable through the application of the best system of
emission reduction which (taking into account the cost of achieving
such reduction) the Administrator determines has been adequately
demonstrated.""" The Portland Cement court construed this language
to mean that the Administrator is required not only to take into ac-
count the economic costs of compliance by the industry but also any
"counter-productive environmental effects" of a proposed standard."
75. 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), petition for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3388
(U.S. Jan. 8, 1974) (No. 73-1008).
76. 489 F.2d 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
77. Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 386-87 (D.C. Cir.
1973); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 489 F.2d 1247, 1257 (D.C. Cir.
1973). See also Essex Chem. Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 427, 431 n.6 (D.C. Cir.
1973) cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3610 (U.S. Apr. 29, 1974).
78. Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 386 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
79. See notes 1-8 supra and accompanying text.
80. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-6 (1970). See note 4 supra.
A "new source" is defined as a stationary source, the construction or modification
of which commences after applicable regulations or proposed regulations are published.
Id. -6(a)(2). A "modification" is a physical change or a change in the method of
operation of a stationary source which has the result of increasing the emission of a
pollutant or causing the emission of a new pollutant from that source. Id. -6(a) (4)
(1970).
81. Id. -6(a) (1) (emphasis added).
82. Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 385 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
accord, Essex Chem. Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 427, 431 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
In a footnote, the court in Portland Cement spells out its construction of the "best
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Accordingly, the District of Columbia Circuit interpreted section 111
as requiring the equivalent of a NEPA statement:
The [Clean Air] Act thus requires that the Administrator accompany
a proposed standard with a statement of reasons that sets for [sic]
the environmental considerations, pro and con, which have been taken
into account as required by the Act, and fulfillment of this requirement
is reviewable directly by this Court. 3
The EPA was thus excused from formal, procedural compliance with
NEPA within the context of what the court termed a narrow statutory
exemption. 4 One aspect of the Clean Air Act which, although not
dispositive, was a "substantial consideration '85 in the court's analysis
was the fact that the Act imposes precise time schedules for the prom-
ulgation of new sources standards. Section 111 directed the Adminis-
trator to publish a list of categories of stationary sources within 90
days after December 31, 1970.86 Within 120 days thereafter the Ad-
ministrator was directed to propose standards of performance for each
category named, and within an additional 90 days final regulations
were to be promulgated.8 7  The court rejected the argument that sec-
tion 111 could accommodate delay in the time alloted for the initial
determination of categories of stationary sources until a NEPA state-
ment could be prepared, finding that there was simply "no legal lati-
tude available to delay the action [under the Clean Air Act]." 8 Thus
system of reduction": "The standard of the 'best system' is comprehensive, and we
cannot imagine that Congress intended that 'best' could apply to a system which did
more damage to water than it prevented to air." 486 F.2d at 386 n.42.
83. Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 385 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
84. Id. at 386-87.
85. Id. at 381.
86. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-6(b)(1)(A) (1970).
87. Id. § -6(b)(1)(B).
88. 486 F.2d at 381 n.19. One commentator has rejected the argument that the
time constraints of the Clean Air Act require an exemption from the applicability of
NEPA:
But NEPA does not mandate any particular method or time period for com-
ment. At the time Congress passed the [Clean Air) Act (December 31,
1970), the Council on Environmental Policy [sic] had only issued Interim
Guidelines for the preparation of NEPA statements (see 1 ELR 46001).
Those Guidelines did not mention any set period for the commenting process,
the 90-day period appeared in the Final Guidelines, published April 23, 1971(see ELR 46049). Therefore, it can not fairly be construed that Congress
intended to oust NEPA from the Clean Air Act proceedings by setting impos-
sibly tight deadlines. Comment, supra note 70, at 10,017.
See also Yarrington, The National Environmental Policy Act, 4 BNA ENvmot mr
REP.-Monograph No. 17, at 37 (1974).
Portland Cement points out that a speeded-up NEPA procedure, which would be
necessitated by the strict time requirements, would affect the quality of NEPA state-
ments: "A major difficulty with this approach is that it tends to result in a group
of second-class impact statements, ascribed to time urgencies." 486 F.2d at 381 n.19.
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the development by the Portland Cement court of the concept of full
functional compliance in large part represented an effort by the court
to adhere to the clear deadlines established under the Clean Air Act
for promulgation of air quality standards, while simultaneously vindi-
cating, to the maximum extent possible in light of those deadlines,
the objectives of NEPA.
In Environmental Defense Funds9 the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit approved the EPA's cancellation of DDT registrations pursuant
to FIFRA upon a determination that, like agency regulatory action
under section 111 of the Clean Air Act, the procedures followed under
FIFRA had provided the -functional equivalent of a NEPA investi-
gation.90 The court arrived at this conclusion by noting that the "ex-
plicit language" of FIFRA requires that pesticides be deregistered
if they will be injurious to man and his environment.0 ' The court
further noted that many NEPA protections are offered by FIFRA pro-
ceedings inasmuch as ample judicial review is available under
FIFRA and the opportunity for public comment was afforded in the
lengthy hearings that were held by the EPAY2  The court therefore
concluded that the substantive and procedural aspects of FIFRA pro-
vided for full consideration of environmental issues: "[A]l of the
five core NEPA issues were carefully considered . . . all received at-
tention during the hearings and decision-making process."' 3 The En-
vironmental Defense Fund court did not identify any problem similar
to that presented by the strict time requirements imposed upon the
EPA by section 111 of the Clean Air Act in the Portland Cement
case. 4 In fact, the Administrator even delayed the effective date
of his cancellation order for six months to provide DDT users an op-
portunity to become acquainted with alternative pesticides.95
While Environmental Defense Fund purports to follow directly
Portland Cement's rationale of "functional compliance," it may repre-
The Portland Cement opinion expresses the belief that the functional equivalent ap-
proach would avoid the "straitjacket" which NEPA would impose upon the rigid time
constraints of the Clean Air Act. Id. at 386 n.43.
89. See notes 1, 2, 9-13 supra and accompanying text.
90. See notes 11-13 supra and accompanying text.
91. 489 F.2d at 1256.
92. Id.
93. Id. See note 1 supra.
94. See notes 85-88 supra and accompanying text. It should be noted that, while
the court ignored the issue, the Administrator is under some time constraints under
FIFRA. He must issue his order within 90 days of the completion of hearings.
7 U.S.C. § 1356(c) (1970). See note 130 infra and accompanying text.
95. 489 F.2d at 1250.
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sent a somewhat more broadly applicable exemption than that recog-
nized in the Clean Air Act cases. Because the Environmental De-
fense Fund court, unlike the court in Portland Cement, was not forced
by the deadlines of the Clean Air Act to abandon strict pro forma
compliance with the requirements of NEPA, it may be read as stand-
ing for the broader proposition that NEPA is satisfied in any situation
where there are "substantive and procedural standards" which "ensure
full and adequate consideration of environmental issues.""
SUGGESTED CONTOURS FOR THE EPA EXEMPTION
The Merits of a Broad Exemption
Three circuits, the Third, Fourth, and Sixth, have gone even be-
yond the doctrine of functional equivalence created in Portland Ce-
ment and made broadly applicable in Environmental Defense Fund
to hold that the EPA is not required to comply in any fashion with
the requirements of NEPA when acting in its regulatory capacity."t
Furthermore, neither the Portland Cement nor the Environmental De-
fense Fund court foreclosed the possibility of an exemption from
NEPA for the EPA which is broader than the functional equivalent
exception." In addition, it is clear that Congress could specifically
exempt the EPA from compliance with NEPA as it did in the 1972
amendments to the FWPCA with respect to EPA regulation under
that Act."" There are policy arguments both for and against such
a blanket exemption for the EPA from NEPA. Reasons which have
been advanced in support of a broad exemption include: (1) the fact
that, while NEPA is designed to protect the environment, the EPA
plays a special role with regard to this objective and must be free to
carry out its own mandate, which may require expeditious action that
would be frustrated by strict application of the procedural require-
ments of NEPA; 00 (2) the danger that the opponents of environ-
mental protection would use the impact statement requirement as a
96. Id. at 1257.
97. See text accompanying note 74 supra.
98. Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 384-85 (D.C. Cir.
1973); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 489 F.2d 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
99. 33 U.S.C. § 1371(c) (Supp. I 1972); see Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckels-
haus, 486 F.2d 375, 382 (D.C. Cir. 1973); ANDERSON 116-22. See notes 26-30 supra
and accompanying text.
100. See Yarrington, supra note 88, at 36; Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus,
486 F.2d 375, 383-84 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (dictum). While not finding it necessary to
resolve the issue on the basis of policy arguments, Portland Cement does provide a
concise statement of policy arguments on both sides of the issue. Id.
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tactic of litigation and delay;101 and (3) the heavy administrative bur-
den of preparing impact statements, resulting in interruption and delay
of agency processes. While this administrative burden, is certainly
shared by other federal agencies, it would fall more heavily upon
the EPA, since practically all of its decisions have significant environ-
mental impact.' 0 2  Several suggestions have been advanced to alleviate
101. Cf. ADERSON 121.
102. While it is extremely difficult to estimate the additional manpower which
would be required for the EPA to comply with NEPA, the EPA has undertaken such
a study. U.S. ENrmoNMENTrA PROTETON AGENCY, supra note 38. An EPA task
force compiled estimates of the additional manpower required by NEPA for perform-
ance of each regulatory action presently engaged in by the EPA with the exception
of actions taken pursuant to the FWPCA, which have been exempted by Congress. See
notes 26-30 supra and accompanying text. The report also estimated the additional
manpower which would be required to achieve some form of "intermediate" compliance
with NEPA for each activity. The form of the "intermediate" compliance suggested
was generally the issuance of an environmental "explanation," a procedure which the
EPA has since formally adopted in lieu of issuing full-fledged environmental impact
statements. See notes 38-46 supra and accompanying text. The task force estimates
are as follows: (1) Setting of national ambient air quality standards: One to two ac-
tions per year are anticipated, with little incremental manpower likely to be required
due to NEPA, unless the impact statements would have to include "considerable dis-
cussion of environmental effects and cost/benefit balancing," in which case a 50% in-
crease in man-years will be required. Two to twenty total additional man-years due
to compliance with NEPA are estimated for this activity. Id. at 51. (2) Approval
of state implementation plans: 275 actions per year are anticipated, with incremental
manpower increases due to NEPA compliance estimated to be 27.5-137.5 man-years.
The cost of environmental "explanations" for the same actions is estimated to require
13.75-82.5 man-years. Id. at 55. (3) Establishment of standards of performance for
new stationary sources: ten actions were anticipated for fiscal year 1974 requiring fif-
teen to twenty additional man-years. The intermediate compliance selected for this ac-
tivity is to undertake the analysis required by NEPA without filing the statement. Es-
timates for this approach were ten to fifteen additional man-years for fiscal 1974. Id.
at 57-58. (4) Establishment of emission standards for hazardous air pollutants: one
to three actions per year are anticipated, with 1.5-6.0 additional man-years estimated.
One to six man-years are estimated for intermediate compliance. Id. at 60. (5) Es-
tablishment of motor vehicle emission standards: one to five actions per year are an-
ticipated, requiring one to ten man-years. Id. at 62-63. (6) Suspension of motor vehi-
cle emission standards: one action is estimated for fiscal year 1974. This would re-
quire an additional 2.25-8 man-years to prepare a "brief' impact statement. (Statu-
tory time constraints do not permit preparation of a full impact statement. Id. at 64-
65). The intermediate compliance suggested would require more man-years (7.5-10)
because the task force recommends performance of the type of analysis NEPA requires
"on an ongoing basis." Id. at 66-67. (7) Pesticides registration: A total of 7,615
actions (registrations of new chemicals and uses, renewals, and amendments) are an-
ticipated each year, requiring 101-530 man-years (assuming no multiple-action impact
statements). Id. at 70. The new pesticides act, 7 U.S.C.A. § 136 (Supp. 1974), re-
quires publication of data supporting a decision and thus no additional manpower is
anticipated for intermediate compliance. U.S. ENvmoNmrswAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
supra at 70. (8) Cancellation or suspension of pesticides: Four cancellation proceed-
ings involving a public hearing are anticipated per year, with an estimated four man-
years increment for compliance with NEPA. Ten other cancellation/suspension ac-
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this burden of requiring -the EPA to comply with NEPA, including
selective legislative relief where necessary;10 3 preparation of impact state-
ments in "tiers," the more important, general problems receiving more
comprehensive treatment and the less important problems receiving only
brief treatment; 10 4 and preparation of composite statements covering
multiple agency actions where the impact is sufficiently similar to war-
rant combined treatment. 10 5
Probably the strongest argument against a broad exemption of
the EPA from NEPA's requirement of an environmental impact state-
ment is that the EPA, in taking action to reduce one pollutant, might
ignore the adverse consequences arising in connection with other forms
of pollution.' 0 6 There is also the suggestion that although NEPA com-
pliance is burdensome, it allows "for needed input by other federal
agencies and simultaneously open[s] up the decision-making process
to scrutiny by the public.' 0 7  The benefits of requiring such com-
pliance with NEPA likewise extend to the courts since a NEPA state-
ment provides a comprehensive agency record which allows effective
review of agency decisions.' 08
In order to resolve the question of the entitlement of the EPA
to a blanket exemption from NEPA, however, the analysis must focus
upon whether the basic purpose of NEPA is consistent with the man-
date of the EPA.'0 9 In circumstances where congressional intent is
unclear because the legislative history of an act is ambiguous, it is
appropriate to consider the policies underlying the legislation. 10 Sec-
tions are expected per year, requiring twenty additional man-years. Id. at 72. (9)
Solid waste management guidelines: Two actions per year are estimated, which will
require two to four man-years. Id. at 75. (10) General federal radiation guidance
and generally applicable environmental radiation standards: No incremental manpower
requirements are anticipated. Id. at 76.
The course of action recommended to the agency by the task force was to seek
legislative relief, to implement the spirit of NEPA to the extent practical and to maintain
the position in the courts that NEPA does not legally apply to the agency's regulatory
programs. Id. at 81.
103. See 1973 Duxu L.J. 347, 357-58, in 1972 Developments.
104. ANDEmSON 122. See also Comment, supra note 22, at 10,142.
105. 1973 DuKE L.J. 347, 358, in 1972 Developments.
106. See ANDERSON 118; Yarrington, supra note 88, at 36.
107. Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 384 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Yarrington, supra note 88, at 36.
108. See note 45 supra and accompanying text
109. See Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 383 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
110. See United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 297-98 (1970); Portland Cement
Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 383 (D.C. Cir. 1973); District of Columbia v.
Orleans, 406 F.2d 957, 958-59 (D.C. Cir. 1968). The District of Columbia Circuit
had previously stated the proposition as follows: "Mhe 'plain meaning' doctrine has
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tion 102(2)(C) of NEPA was designed to "institutionalize" environ-
mental decision-making:111 "The apparent purpose of the 'detailed
statement' is to aid in the agencies' own decision making process and
to advise other interested agencies and the public of the environmental
consequences of planned federal action. 1" 2  This process involves a
systematic approach to decision-making and requires a balanced
weighing of costs and benefits toward the goal of reaching an optimal
solution to a resource allocation or other problem confronting an
agency. 113 In order -to satisfy its obligation under NEPA, an agency
must take into account all the "costs" involved in a decision-not only
economic cost but also cost in terms of environmental resources." 4
If this mandate were applied to the EPA, it would require that the
agency consider the effect each regulatory action will have on the total
environment. Accordingly, the EPA would be prohibited from pro-
tecting one feature of the environment to the unreasonable exclusion
of others.
With this analysis of the NEPA impact statement requirement in
mind, it is necessary to examine the unique role of the EPA and to
consider whether its mission would be frustrated by imposing upon
it the procedural requirements of NEPA. The formation of a single
agency to watch over the environment resulted from a realization that
"[d]espite its complexity, for pollution control purposes the environ-
ment must be perceived as a single, interrelated system." 1" 5  The mis-
sion of the EPA was stated to be the supervision of a "coordinated
always been subservient to a truly discernible legislative purpose however discerned, by
equitable construction or recourse to legislative history." Id. at 959 (footnotes omit-
ted).
111. See Farbstein, Implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act-A
View After Three Years, 9 LEx FT SciNIxU 42, 58 (1972). See also Hearings on Ag-
riculture-Environmental and Consumer Protection Appropriations for 1974 Before the
House Subcomm. on Agriculture-Environmental and Consumer Protection of the
House Comm. on Appropriations, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 5, at 188 (1973): "Some
observers have suggested that the true significance of NEPA is that it makes environ-
mental considerations an integral part of the decision-making process of government."
112. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
113. Id. at 1113. See generally Note, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the National En-
vironmental Policy Act of 1969, 24 STAN. L. REv. 1092 (1972).
114. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1113 (D.C.
Cir. 1971). Questions have been raised concerning the capability of agencies to quan-
tify and value environmental resources. Furthermore, it is not clear from the Calvert
Cliffs' opinion how agencies are to determine the relative importance to be assigned
to the various factors involved in the balancing process. See ANDmSON 256-58; Note,
supra note 113, at 1097.




attack" on the pollutants which threaten that system." 6 Obviously,
this role will be fulfilled only if the EPA carefully considers the im-
pact of each of its regulatory decisions on the entire environmental
system. That is, of course, precisely the protection offered by a
NEPA statement. The question remains whether, given the identity
of purpose between NEPA and the mission of the EPA, there is any
need for actual procedural compliance with NEPA by the EPA. If
there is any danger that the EPA will fail -to comply with its own man-
date, the argument for application of the procedural requirements of
NEPA to the EPA is strengthened. In fact, this danger was illustrated
in Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus where the EPA took the position that
it could not take into account anything other than air purity in setting
an ambient air quality standard. 117 The EPA's contention that it could
not even peek at alternatives"" was clearly at odds with its own basic
mandate, which is to regard the environment as a single system.
Thus, in situations where Congress has not created a statutory exemp-
tion or at least mandated a separate procedure for accomplishment
of the cost-benefit analysis required by NEPA, the procedural protec-
tions of NEPA offer the only guarantee that the EPA will fulfill its
complete function. This alone constitutes a sufficient reason to reject
the argument that the EPA is entitled to a blanket exemption from
NEPA. The question remains, however, whether the "functional
equivalent" doctrine announced in Portland Cement and arguably
made broadly applicable in Environmental Defense Fund represents
a correct balancing of these policy concerns.
The Validity of the Functional Equivalence Doctrine
The "functional equivalent" exception to NEPA's impact state-
ment requirement is subject -to criticism on some of the same policy
grounds as those which have been advanced to dispute the argument
for a blanket exemption of the EPA from NEPA. Full compliance
with the procedures of NEPA mandates that the inquiry into the en-
vironmental impact of a proposed federal action be conducted in a
116. Id. The mechanism for this approach was outlined in the President's Message:
-Identify pollutants.
-Trace them through the entire ecological chain, observing and recording
changes in form as they occur.
-Determine the total exposure of man and his environment.
-Examine interactions among forms of pollution.
-Identify where in the ecological chain interdiction would be most appropri-
ate. Id.
117. 352 F. Supp. 697, 710 (D. Colo. 1972). See notes 47-64 supra and accom-




systematic fashion, with comment from the public and other agencies
solicited specifically for the purpose of responding to a preliminary
position taken by the EPA on the environmental impact of its proposed
action." 0  Such an approach contrasts sharply with the ad hoc nature
of the "functional equivalent" approach. Furthermore, where there
is a departure from the procedures outlined in NEPA, the agency is
not required to consider or set out for scrutiny by the public, other
agencies, or Congress those alternative means of achieving the same
agency goals which are outside the administrator's sole authority to
implement. 120  Finally, agencies other than the EPA have not been
excused from strict procedural compliance with NEPA merely because
agency procedures provide for the equivalent in substance to a NEPA
statement.' 21 In light of these considerations the validity of the func-
tional equivalent exception to NEPA's impact statement requirement
would seem to be open to challenge.
The Statutory Conflict Doctrine
There is, however, another line of analysis that could be used
to justify the specific exemptions in Portland Cement and Environmen-
tal Defense Fund. This approach focuses upon the language in sec-
tion 102(2)(C) of NEPA which requires compliance "to the fullest
extent possible."' 22  While this passage has largely been ignored by
the cases considering the applicability of NEPA to the EPA, it has
been interpreted in a number of other NEPA cases, most notably Cal-
vert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. AEC. 2 2 That case lim-
ited the potential scope of this exception to NEPA by stating that the
provision was not to be used to permit NEPA to become a "paper
tiger."'2 4  Rather, the requirement sets a high standard for the
agencies: "Section 102 duties are not inherently flexible. They
must be complied with to the fullest extent, unless there is a clear
conflict of statutory authority."' 2 5 Applying this interpretation to the
119. See ANDERSON 120.
120. Id. at 120-21.
121. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Grant, 341 F. Supp. 356,
365-66 (E.D.N.C. 1972).
122. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970) (emphasis added).
123. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
124. Id. at 1114.
125. Id. at 1115 (emphasis added). Section 104 of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4334
(1970), provides that nothing in section 102 shall in any way affect the specific statu-
tory obligations of any federal agency
(1) to comply with criteria or standards of environmental quality, (2) to
coordinate or consult with any other Federal or State agency, or (3) to act,
or refrain from acting contingent upon the recommendations or certification
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instant problem, the proper path for developing the role of the EPA
within the mandate of NEPA would be to examine the EPA's specific
statutory function on a program-by-program basis. Where there is a
clear statutory conflict, explicit or implicit, the EPA would qualify for
an exemption from strict procedural compliance. 12 6 Under this analy-
sis, where an EPA statutory duty requires a departure from full com-
pliance, the language of NEPA which requires compliance "to the ful-
lest extent possible" would provide for an exemption.' 27
CONCLUSION
Application of this statutory-conflict approach in Portland Cement
and Environmental Defense Fund would have enabled the courts in
those cases to reach the same result as was reached under the
"functional equivalence" approach, thus giving substantial weight
to the total environmental as well as economic and social impact of
the standards under consideration, but would have reached this result
through an approach of more certain legal validity than the functional
equivalence doctrine.'2 8  For example, in Portland Cement a statutory
conflict could seem to have clearly existed in that it would almost cer-
tainly have been impossible for the EPA Administrator to comply
with the time constraints of section 111 of the Clean Air Act and
also fully comply with the procedures of NEPA governing the
issuance of an environmental impact statement. 2 9 It seems quite
of any other Federal or State agency.
Calvert Cliffs' concludes that "[o]nly when such specific obligations conflict with
NEPA do agencies have a right under § 104 and the 'fullest extent possible' language
to dilute their compliance with the full letter and spirit of the Act." 449 F.2d at 1115
n.12.
126. The term "implicit exemption" is intended to apply to those circumstances
where a statutory requirement makes full compliance impossible. See 115 CONG. RFC.
40,417-18 (1969); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109,
1114 (D.C. Cir. 1971); CEQ GUmELmnS § 4, 38 Fed. Reg. 20,550 (1973).
127. The Portland Cement court noted that one difficulty with this approach is that
it by necessity gives rise to an inferior class of impact statements. 486 F.2d 375, 381
n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See note 88 supra.
128. See notes 119-21 supra and accompanying text.
129. Cf. Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 380-81 (D.C. Cir.
1973). See notes 85-88 supra and accompanying text. See U.S. ENvmoNmENTAL PRo-
TECrION AGENCY, supra note 38, at 37.
Frederick Anderson of the Environmental Law Institute takes the position that
new, strict statutory deadlines should not automatically excuse the agency from compli-
ance with NEPA. He offers three suggestions as to how the conflict may be resolved:
[Iln the event incompatibility appears to exist, either the more specific reg-
ulatory legislation in fact governs, guidelines specifying incompatible objec-
tives may be rewritten to accommodate compliance with both acts, or EPA
may be asked to make a special effort to move the administrative process
more rapidly than it might like in order to comply. ANDERSON 119.
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likely that more time would have been required for the Administrator
to have prepared a detailed impact statement, circulated it to other
agencies for comment, -and assessed those comments, than he would
have been allowed under section 11i's deadlines for the setting of
air quality standards. But rather than merely finding compliance upon
the satisfaction by the EPA of some rather arbitrarily defined degree
of functional compliance with NEPA as did the court in Portland Cem-
ent, the preferable approach in that case would seem to have been de-
manding the fullest possible adherence to the requirements of NEPA,
consistent with full compliance with the Clean Air Act-a statute ex-
pressly directing that a particular environmental responsibility be car-
ried out by a designated environmental agency in a congressionally
specified manner-whether or not the resulting compliance with the
more generally applicable requirements of NEPA constituted the
"functional equivalent" of an impact statement. Similarly, this "statu-
tory-conflict" analysis would arguably have resulted in a more nearly
correct balancing of the specific objectives of FIFRA and those
of NEPA in the Environmental Defense Fund case, had it been used
in lieu of a merely ad hoe determination by the court that substantive
and procedural requirements of FIFRA constitute the "functional
equivalent" of an environmental impact statement. If the court had
applied the "statutory-conflict" analysis, it could have concluded that a
number of specific objectives of FIFRA may well have been sac-
rificed by the requirement of an environmental impact statement in
that case. For example, although the court made no mention of the
fact, under FIFRA the EPA Administrator is specifically required
to issue his order regarding cancellation or registration of a pesticide
within ninety days of the hearing required under the Act, 30 a time
period of sufficient brevity that in some cases it might not be possible
for the Administrator to compile the detailed impadt statement de-
manded by NEPA.' 8' Furthermore, several recent court decisions
have required that a federal agency file an impact statement prior to
holding a public hearing on a proposed federal action significantly af-
fecting the environment. 132 If such a requirement were imposed on
the EPA Administrator when moving to register or cancel the registra-
tion of a chemical under FIFRA, the EPA would itself be forced
to gather the information necessary to evaluate the environmental im-
130. 7 U.S.C. § 135b(c) (1970).
131. Cf. U.S. ENViRONmENTAL PRoT=ON AMENcY, supra note 38, at 71-72.
132. See, e.g., Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972); Harlem Valley Transp. Ass'n v. Stafford, 360 F. Supp.
1057, 1065 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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pact of its proposed action.' Such a development, stemming from
enforcement of NEPA's impact statement requirement, would in es-
sence shift the burden of proof regarding the safety of chemicals from
the registrant, on whom it is specifically placed by FIFRA, to the
administrator.134
Where these specific environmental objectives under FIFRA
come into conflict in this fashion with NEPA's more general require-
ment that federal agencies file an environmental impact statement for
major federal actions significantly affecting the environment, it may
be argued that the correct resolution is a "statutory-conflict" approach
which fully vindicates the more specific congressional provision for
protection of the environment, and then satisfies the more general re-
quirements of NEPA "to the fullest extent possible' in light of the
necessity of giving priority to the more specific environmental protec-
tion provision. It is submitted that this approach is clearly preferable
to that followed by the three circuit courts which, by giving the EPA
a blanket exemption from NEPA's impact statement requirement,
placed no weight on the broader environmental concerns of NEPA,
and that it is also superior to the approach of the Portland Cement
and Environmental Defense Fund courts which gave these concerns
only slightly greater credence in their subjective determination that
the Clean Air Act and FIFRA require the "functional equivalent" of
an environmental impact statement.
133. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENcY, supra note 38, at 71.
134. Continental Chemiste Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 461 F.2d 331, 335 (7th Cir.
1972); Stearns Elec. Paste Co. v. EPA, 461 F.2d 293, 304-05 (7th Cir. 1972); U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCy, supra note 38, at 71.
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